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Abstract  
 
The effect of model reliability on children’s choices to learn socially versus individually is 
pertinent to theories addressing cultural evolution and theories of selective trust. Here the 
effect of a reliable versus unreliable model on children’s preferences to learn socially or 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
MODEL RELIABILITY ON SOCIAL OR INDIVIDUAL LEARNING  2 
 
 
individually was examined, as well as their subsequent imitation on a puzzle box task. 
Experiment One (N=156) found children were more likely to ask to learn socially when 
presented with a novel task, after witnessing an unreliable rather than a reliable model. 
Experiment Two (N=40) found children select a new unknown model, over the previously 
unreliable model, suggesting a preference to learn socially was created, although not 
specifically from the unreliable model. Experiment Three (N=48) replicated children’s 
learning preference in Experiment One with a new task, and showed children’s attention is 
drawn towards other sources of social information (another adult model) when viewing an 
unreliable model, and also found a reliable model caused more fidelity of imitation. Together 
these results suggest that model unreliability causes greater social learning requests and 
attention to other, even novel, models when they are available. These findings evidence 
human children’s strong propensity to learn socially compared with non-human animals; and 
suggest there is a more complicated relationship between learning preference, model 
reliability and selective trust than has been captured in previous research.  
 
 
Keywords: social learning; model-based biases; selective trust; social learning strategy; 
cultural evolution  
 
How does the reliability of a model affect children’s choice to learn socially or individually? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Using social information, that is information generated by other individuals’ 
behaviour, can be advantageous in a wide range of situations (Galef & Giraldeau, 2001). 
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However, the uncritical use of social information is evolutionarily no more adaptive than 
individual learning (Giraldeau, Valone, & Templeton, 2002; Rogers, 1988), and it has been 
hypothesised that rules governing selective use of social information may be required to 
ensure an evolutionary advantage (social learning strategies, SLS, Laland, 2004). Adaptive 
use of social information is acute for children, who in becoming successful members of their 
society, must adopt the distinctive beliefs, practices and language of their group (Tomasello, 
1999; Vygotsky, 1978). In acquiring this cultural knowledge, children face the problem of 
determining on which sources of information to rely (Harris, 2007). Selective social learning 
research has uncovered the importance of: (i) copying based on the frequency of the 
occurrence of behaviour, (ii) the content of the information, (iii) the state of the learner, and 
(iv) the characteristics of the demonstrator (Rendell et al., 2011). Here we investigate the 
latter in children, known as ‘model-based biases’ in the SLS and cultural evolution literature 
(Wood, Kendal, & Flynn, 2013); which overlaps, in part, with the ‘selective trust in 
informants’ literature (Harris & Corriveau, 2011; Harris, 2007). Both frameworks investigate 
how a model’s attributes affect social learning choices; yet, where selective trust research has 
primarily compared children’s choice between two models, SLS research has had a greater 
focus on examining how model attributes affect the choice to learn socially versus 
individually (asocially). With the exception of Flynn, Turner and Giraldeau (2016), the 
causes and consequences of children’s social versus individual learning preferences have not 
been directly examined. The current research fulfils two main aims: (i) to investigate the role 
of model reliability on the preference to learn socially versus individually in young children 
(‘learning preference’), and (ii) to shed light on how to interpret the majority of previous 
selective trust research, which has measured children’s selective trust by a comparison choice 
of the reliability of two models.    
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Koenig, Clément and Harris (2004) introduced the ‘trust’ paradigm, which 
investigates children’s preferences for models based on their attributes, particularly 
reliability. In the trust paradigm procedure, children are typically introduced to two models, 
one who labels familiar objects accurately, displaying reliability, and one who is inaccurate, 
displaying unreliability. Both models then give different novel names for unfamiliar objects; 
with the name which children adopt being a measure of which informant they trust. In this 
forced choice, young children consistently adopt the labels of reliable over unreliable models 
(Harris et al., 2013; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Koenig et al., 2004). Children also trust 
previously reliable models over unreliable models in the tool-use domain (Birch, Vauthier, & 
Bloom, 2008), and in learning normative rules (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2009).   
 Significantly, no study of model reliability has given children the choice to learn a 
task individually rather than from an informant. Instead, the focus has been on how the 
properties of different models affect a child’s choice of whom to copy and how this operates 
in different domains. However, it may be the case that children would rather explore a task 
themselves than learn from certain models. Individual learning has been widely studied in the 
cultural evolution and animal behaviour literature, as it poses an adaptive alternative method 
to learn about the world when social information is not fruitful (Giraldeau et al., 2002). Flynn 
and colleagues (2016) began the study of learning preference in children, by measuring the 
proportion of children selecting to learn socially versus individually, and how this choice 
affected task performance. Children were asked if they wanted to attempt to extract a reward 
from novel puzzle-box apparatus, either by watching a model demonstrate the solution first or 
attempt the task themselves, learning individually. Children’s choice was noted, but they 
were then in fact randomly allocated to receive a social demonstration or not, allowing the 
connection between learning preference and performance to be examined over early 
development. For three- and five-year-olds a substantial proportion wished to learn socially 
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and performed well when doing so. Interestingly, by five years there was an increased 
understanding of when attempting a task individually would be effective, with children who 
selected to learn individually performing better at the task.   
Understanding children’s learning preference in the light of model reliability extends 
our understanding of cultural learning and transmission. For instance, Flynn and colleagues 
(2016)’s findings of a small proportion of individual learners and a general proclivity to learn 
socially, reflects children’s roles in cultural transmission as primarily social learners primed 
to take adult instruction. The first aim of the current study was to examine how this apparent 
disposition changes when model reliability changes. It is known that model attributes do 
affect children’s social learning (Wood et al., 2013), and are of importance in cultural 
transmission in general (Rendell et al., 2011). It might be that children adhere to the model 
argued to apply to many non-human animals, in which unreliable social information results in 
a greater propensity to use individual information (Giraldeau et al., 2002). Alternatively, 
children might follow findings such as those produced by Templeton (1998), in which a 
preference to observe an unreliable model was found on the basis that observing a lack of 
success can be more informative than a success (although see Horner & Whiten, 2007).   
The current experiment not only contributes to our understanding of the interplay 
between children’s individual and social learning, but also sheds light on the interpretation of 
the results from experiments using the trust paradigm, by assessing a baseline of propensity 
to copy reliable or unreliable models. An intuitive hypothesis from the selective trust 
literature would be that a reliable model would cause a greater proportion of social learning, 
whereas an unreliable model would promote individual learning. However, previous studies 
manipulating model reliability across separate conditions, rather than in a forced choice, 
indicate we may find other results. Koenig and Echols (2003) found infants direct greater 
attention to models who incorrectly label objects, than those who label objects correctly. 
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Similarly, Krogh-Jespersen and Echols (2012) found that toddlers were equally likely to learn 
novel labels from reliable and unreliable speakers. In contrast, Koenig and Woodward (2010) 
found toddlers learnt novel words less robustly from unreliable rather than reliable 
informants. Vanderbilt, Heyman and Liu (2014) directly tested the effect of three- and four-
year-olds’ trust in a unreliable, neutral or reliable model when they were presented in a forced 
choice versus across separate conditions. They measured children’s assessment of the quality 
of these sources, replicating previous findings of a preference for neutral and reliable models 
in a forced choice, over an unreliable model. However, the selective trust effect did not 
extend to situations in which the models were presented separately; in these cases, children 
used the information from a previously unreliable model in the same proportion as a reliable 
model and rated them similarly in terms of their value as sources of information. Together 
these findings point to something more complicated occurring than trusting more reliable 
informants (and, potentially, distrusting unreliable informants), especially when there is not a 
direct comparison of informants. It may be that reliable versus unreliable models are quite 
distinct in the effect they have on children’s behaviour; a fact not captured well by forced 
choice designs. For the second aim of this experiment, contextualising the findings of 
previous selective trust in informants research, we suggest three competing hypotheses: (i) 
children will prefer to learn socially from reliable models and individually when presented 
with unreliable models (Koenig et al., 2004; Koenig & Woodward, 2010), (ii) children will 
show no difference in learning preference based on model reliability (Krogh-Jespersen & 
Echols, 2012; Vanderbilt et al, 2014), or (iii) more social learning requests will be produced 
when presented with an unreliable rather than when presented with a reliable model. For 
instance, there is increased attention to unreliable models and this may be reflected in 
increased requests to observe them (Koenig & Echols, 2003), perhaps because they provide 
more information (Templeton, 1998).   
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In Experiment One children’s preferences to learn socially or individually after 
viewing a reliable or unreliable model were examined along with aspects of task 
performance, specifically children’s fidelity in copying sequences of actions (‘imitation 
fidelity’). Further, our task allowed an examination of the copying of goals or outcomes as 
well as sequence copying (by whether children copy the goal of the model in a situation 
where they were incentivised not to by the possibility of acquiring a larger reward). We also 
examined the effect of model reliability on task success. The role of a model’s reliability on 
an observer’s subsequent behaviour has also received research attention, with evidence 
showing that a reliable model increases the fidelity and success of subsequent performance 
(e.g., Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010). The logic of the relationship between 
model reliability and proclivity to imitate is the same as for novel naming (outlined above): a 
model’s actions and goals are a forms of information, and the degree to which children 
adhere to this information represents their level of trust (for a review see Wood, Kendal, & 
Flynn, 2013). However, a disjunction between children’s requests for information and 
action/goal copying is also of theoretical value. For instance, asking for further information 
carries less risk than engaging in action, therefore children may have a lower threshold for 
unreliability in the former than the latter.  
Experiment One tested three- and five-year-olds, as in Flynn and colleagues (2016). 
In Experiment Two, children were presented with the opportunity to learn from a model who 
had previously been established as either reliable or unreliable, or from a new model. This 
allowed us to elucidate the nature of any social preference; specifically, whether it was a 
general social preference, thus including new models, or was specific to the model who had 
previously had their reliability established. Experiment Three extended the research to a new 
task and examined the attention of children during the stimuli presentation.  
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2. Experiment One 
 
2.1. Method 
 
2.1.1. Participants 
 Seventy-eight three-year-olds (39 girls; M = 41.99 months, SD = 3.02 months) and 78 
five-year-olds (37 girls; M = 66.20 months, SD = 3.22 months) from schools in the North 
East of England participated. The majority of children were White British, Asian being the 
second most represented ethnic group. Informed consent was provided by the children’s 
parents, and school’s staff. All children verbally consented to participate when asked if they 
wished to take part. Ethical approval was given by the School of Education’s Ethics 
Committee at Durham University.  
 
2.1.2. Design 
A 2 (model reliability: reliable or unreliable) by 2 (learning preference: social or 
individual) between-subjects quasi-experimental design was employed, over two age groups 
(three- and five-year-olds); with learning preference also being a measured variable. Control 
conditions with each age group were conducted, in which children were simply presented 
with the task, a puzzle box, with no demonstration. This design allowed us to examine: (i) 
whether children choose to learn socially or individually in relation to the model’s reliability, 
and (ii) how this affected their copying behaviour and success at the task. 
 
2.1.3. Materials 
2.1.3.1. Apparatus. A novel apparatus, the 'Duobox' (see Figure 1), was presented to 
the children. The Duobox is constructed with two side-by-side compartments which were 
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identical except for the colour of the back wall (blue versus red). All other walls were 
transparent, so a reward contained inside each compartment could be seen easily. The 
rewards were a single sticker versus 12 stickers (the size of the large reward was easily 
distinguishable and appeared appealing when looking into the apparatus), which were 
counterbalanced across compartments over trials. The same three defences were present on 
each door at the front of each compartment: (i) a ‘lock’ that needed to be pulled to the right, 
(ii) a ‘hook’ that needed to be pulled to the right, and (iii) a horizontal ‘latch’ that needed to 
be twisted to a vertical position, along with an irrelevant action, (iv) a ‘bolt’ on the top of 
each compartment could also be removed. The three defences (i, ii and iii) had to be removed 
to allow a door at the front of the compartment to be opened, and the reward retrieved.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
2.1.3.2. Reliability stimulus. To manipulate model reliability a stimulus video was 
created replicating a procedure that has been shown to produce a robust effect for up to a 
week later (Corriveau & Harris, 2009). The video showed the same model either incorrectly 
(unreliable model condition), or correctly (reliable model condition) naming four common 
objects. In the unreliable model condition, the model identified a spoon as a duck, a bottle as 
an apple, a brush as a plate, and a doll as a cup. Further, the stimulus video showed the model 
indicating either the usual (reliable model) or casually-impractical (unreliable model) 
functions for two tools (Birch et al., 2007; Seston Schillaci & Kelemen, 2013). In the 
unreliable condition, the model stated a potato masher was for drinking, and a sponge was for 
writing; instead of mashing or washing, respectively, as stated by the reliable model.  As a 
manipulation check, children were asked to identify the above objects and object functions. 
Ninety-seven percent of five-year-olds and 98% three-year-olds correctly identified three or 
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more of the four objects; with 95% of both age groups, correctly identifying at least one of 
the two object functions. 
Social learning stimulus. A second video showed the same model opening the 
Duobox. The model first removed the bolt on the top of the apparatus, and then demonstrated 
how to remove the three defences on the apparatus (left to right on the apparatus: lock, hook, 
latch), one after the other. The order in which the defences were removed was held constant, 
and the model always removed the lower quantity reward (the side, red or blue, was 
counterbalanced). Images from the stimuli and of the testing spaces are presented in the 
Supplementary Material.  
 
2.1.4. Procedure  
 Testing took place in a quiet room away from other children within the child’s school. 
The testing began by showing the child the reliable or unreliable model video. Then the 
apparatus was revealed to the child, s/he was told it was their job to retrieve something from 
inside, and asked "Do you want to have a go at getting it out yourself first or do you want to 
watch the person who you just saw, have a go at getting it out first?" Thus, children had the 
choice to either learn individually or socially. The child's preference was met, and so either 
s/he attempted to receive the reward, or were presented with the video of the model retrieving 
the reward, and then attempted the task.  
 Learning preference was coded dichotomously depending on the child’s request to 
learn socially (score of 1) or individually (score of -1). Copying of action sequence, imitation 
fidelity, was coded dichotomously: copying the exact action sequence scored 1, versus 
performing a different sequence scored -1. Preliminary analyses showed that irrelevant action 
copying overwhelmingly took place as part of sequence copying and produced the same 
pattern of results for our questions of interest; the dichotomous measure of overall ‘imitation 
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fidelity’, was therefore employed as it was the most explanatory measure of sequence 
copying for this apparatus (for separate analyses of irrelevant action copying see 
Supplementary Material). As the non-modelled side had a larger reward, our design also 
allowed us to examine the effect of reward size on children’s goal copying, attempting to 
retrieve the small reward (copying goal), scored 1, and attempting to retrieve the large reward 
(not copying goal) scored -1. Children also received a dichotomous score for their task 
success, measured as successful retrieval of a reward from the Duobox (scoring 1), versus 
task failure, an inability to retrieve the reward within 5 minutes (scoring -1). A random 
sample of 20% of the experimental sessions was coded by a second rater who was blind to 
the aims of the study. A high level of agreement was found (Cohen’s κ scores .867–1.000), 
therefore the original coding was used for analyses. 
 
2.2. Results 
  
2.2.1. Task baseline  
When children were only presented with the Duobox, it was found that low levels of 
both three- and five-year-old children spontaneously used the action sequence performed by 
the model in the experiment (see Table 1). A large proportion of five-year-olds attempted to 
attain the larger reward. However, three-year-olds’ attempts to retrieve the large reward did 
not differ from chance. Also, the task appeared not to be overly challenging for five-year-
olds, a large proportion being successful at retrieving the reward. Three-year-olds found it 
challenging, and their success rate did not differ from chance.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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2.2.2. Main question analyses  
The first section presents analyses examining relative learning preference, and task 
performance behaviour (i.e. imitation fidelity, goal copying, and success), between the 
reliable and unreliable model conditions, along with age. Then, analyses treating reliable and 
unreliable models as being distinct stimuli, analysing effects on subsequent learning 
preference/task performance behaviour are reported (as in, Koenig & Echols, 2003; 
Vanderbilt et al., 2014).  
 
2.2.3. Learning preference with regard to model reliability  
We performed a binary logistic regression with learning preference (social coded 1, 
individual -1) as the dependent variable and model reliability (unreliable coded 1, reliable -1) 
and age (five coded 1, three -1) included as predictors, Χ2(2, N = 124) = 7.67, p = .022. We 
also considered a model including an age by model reliability interaction term, but it was 
found not to be more explanatory, therefore the previous model was preferred. Significantly 
more children chose to learn socially in the unreliable model condition (70% social, M = .02, 
SD = 1.01) than in the reliable model condition (51% social, M = .41, SD = .92), β = .42, SE 
= .19, p = .029. There was no significant relationship between five-year-olds (70% social, M 
= .39, SD = .99) and three-year-olds in learning preference (55% social, M = .10, SD = 1.00), 
β = .32, SE = .19, p = .098.  
After seeing an unreliable model, significantly more five-year-olds chose to learn 
socially (78%) rather than individually (22%), binomial t(35) = 3.17, p = .001 (see Figure 2), 
compared to a null model. However, there was no significant difference for five-year-olds 
between social (58%) and individual learning preferences (42%) after seeing a reliable 
model, binomial t(25) = .59, p = .556. Three-year-olds showed no significant difference 
between preferences for learning socially (64%) and individually (36%) after seeing the 
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unreliable model, binomial t(35) = 1.50, p = .135; nor was there any significant difference in 
social (58%) and individual (42%) learning preference in the reliable model condition, 
binomial t(25) = .59, p = .556.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
2.2.4. Effect of model reliability on imitation fidelity, goal copying, and success 
 Analyses of model reliability and age on task performance measures are reported in 
Tables 1 and 2. There was no significant difference between reliable (41% exact copy, M = 
.41, SD = .50) and unreliable model conditions (32% exact copy, M = 32, SD = .47), in 
imitation fidelity; however, it was found that five-year-olds (49% exact copy, M = .49, SD = 
.51) copied with significantly more fidelity than three-year-olds (18% exact copy, M = .18, 
SD = .39). In terms of goal copying, there was no significant difference between reliable 
(60% model match, M = .19, SD = 1.00) and unreliable model conditions (67% model match, 
M = .20, SD = .99), nor between five- (69% model match, M = .21, SD = .99) or three-year-
olds (64% model match, M = .18, SD = 1.00).  In terms of task success, social learning 
preference was also entered into the model, there was no significant difference between 
reliable (87% successful, M = .74, SD = .68) and unreliable model conditions (82% 
successful, M = .63, SD = .78), nor between five- (90% successful, M = .79, SD = .61) or 
three-year-olds (71% successful, M = .41, SD = .92). However, those who chose to learn 
socially (and thereby did) were significantly more successful (91% successful, M = .82, SD = 
.58) than those who chose to learn individually (72% successful, M = .45, SD = .90). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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 Table 1 reports analyses for task performance measures after seeing either a reliable 
or unreliable model, broken down by age, compared to a null model. Both after witnessing a 
reliable or unreliable model, three-year-olds used action sequences other than exact copying 
(low imitation fidelity) at significantly higher proportion than exact copying. Five-year-olds 
in both model reliability conditions did not differ from a null model in their exact action 
copying. In both model reliability conditions, and for each age group, goal copying did not 
differ from a null model. Across model reliability and age group conditions, a significant 
proportion of children were successful at the task.  
 
2.3. Discussion  
 
Witnessing an unreliable model led to a greater number of social learning requests 
than witnessing a reliable model. There was no difference based on age for learning 
preference; however, analyses within model reliability and age group conditions suggests that 
the social learning preference resulting from an unreliable model may be stronger for five-
year-olds than three-year-olds. Similar proportions of social learning preference were seen 
after observing a reliable model across age groups. However, observing an unreliable, as 
compared to a reliable model, had no effect on the actions used or success on the task. Five-
year-olds copied the demonstrated action sequence more closely than three-year-olds. Yet, 
there was no age-related difference in task success or goal copying. Asking for and receiving 
a social learning demonstration made children more successful at the task (as in Flynn et al., 
2016).  
Regarding learning preference, what was unclear from these findings was whether 
children in this experiment were disposed to learn specifically from the unreliable model, or 
whether they simply wanted a social demonstration after having observed an unreliable 
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model. Within Experiment One’s setup, the only social learning option was to learn from the 
previously witnessed model. Accordingly, on the basis of these findings, it is difficult to 
determine if children were drawn to learn from the unreliable model because they may 
provide more information (Templeton, 1998) or because they simply found the model 
amusing and wanted to see more of them. Or alternatively, if the children were generally 
inclined to learn socially after witnessing an unreliable model, the only way to fulfil this 
propensity was to choose the model they had previously seen within this experiment. 
Therefore, a second experiment was conducted to distinguish between these alternatives. 
Experiment Two followed the same procedure as Experiment One; however, here the 
children’s choice was to learn either from a model they have previously seen (reliable or 
unreliable) or a new model. Given that age was not a significant predictor of learning 
preference, Experiment Two focused on five-year-olds for whom the effect was the strongest. 
 
3. Experiment Two 
 
3.1. Method 
 
3.1.1. Participants   
 An additional 40 five-year-old children (20 girls) were recruited from the same 
schools in North East England (M = 64.89, SD = 3.58). Ethical procedures and sample 
demography were the same as in Experiment One.  
 
3.1.2. Materials 
 The apparatus and stimuli were identical to those in Experiment One, except that a 
second set of video stimuli, including a full set of reliability stimuli, for a second model was 
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employed. The second model wore black, distinguishing them from the original female 
model, who wore white.  The specific model, as well as reliability condition, was 
counterbalanced across participants (for visualisation of the stimuli see the Supplementary 
Material). Children saw a separate still image of both models when asked to respond, as 
outlined below.  
 
3.1.3. Procedure and Design  
 The procedure used was identical to Experiment One in establishing the reliability of 
the model, except that one of two sets of stimuli (with the model from Experiment One or the 
new model) was presented, counterbalanced across conditions. Instead of being asked if they 
wished to learn socially or individually, children viewed an image of the two models, the 
model who had been established as reliable or unreliable, and a new (unknown) model. 
Children were asked to point out this distinction, responding to the question: “Do you want to 
learn from the girl you watched before, or do you want to watch this new girl?” Children 
watched their chosen model retrieving the reward from the Duobox, and then they attempted 
the task. As a manipulation check, after their attempt, children were asked, “Was the model 
from the video good at naming things or did she get the names wrong?” Eighty-nine percent 
of children in the reliable condition (binomial t(18) = 3.21, p < .001) and 79% of children in 
the unreliable condition (binomial t(18) = 2.29, p = .019) rightly identified the model’s 
competence or lack of competence. We employed a 2 level (model reliability: reliable or 
unreliable) between-subjects design, measuring children’s preference for the old model they 
had observed a demonstration of reliability for (scoring -1), or the new model (scoring 1).  
 
3.2. Results  
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 As in Experiment One, we first present analyses comparing model choice then 
examine effect of conditions separately. Binary logistic regression revealed no difference 
between reliable (75% new model, M = .10, SD = 1.02) and unreliable (55% new model, M = 
.50, SD = .89) model reliability conditions (unreliable model coded 1, reliable -1), in 
predicting children’s choice for a new model (coded 1) versus old model (coded -1), Χ2(1, N 
= 40) = 1.77, p = .183, β = -.90, SE = .69, p = .190. However, after witnessing an unreliable 
model, significantly more children chose to learn from a new model than from the (old) 
unreliable model, binomial t(19) = 2.01, p = .041 (see Figure 3). After witnessing a reliable 
model, there was no significant difference in children’s choice to learn from the new model, 
and the (old) reliable model, binomial t(19) = .22, p = .824.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
3.3. Discussion 
 
Our results reveal that, when children were confronted with a choice of learning from 
an unreliable model or a new model, children prefer to learn from a new model; with no such 
differential preference appearing in the reliable model condition. Taken together with 
Experiment One’s results, it appears children wish to learn socially after seeing an unreliable 
model; yet, when given a choice, this social learning preference is directed to a novel model 
compared with the previously unreliable model. Several things can be concluded from these 
results. First, children encode the unreliable source as someone from whom it is less desirable 
to learn. Second, the desire to learn socially after witnessing an unreliable model is general. 
That is, third, explanations centred on a legitimate preference to learn from unreliable 
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models, for instance because they may provide more information (Templeton, 1998), can be 
ruled out.  
Koenig and Echols (2003) found children paid more attention to unreliable than 
reliable models, providing reasoning about why such a general social learning preference 
might be found after witnessing unreliable models. Koenig and Echols concluded that an 
adult labelling familiar objects incorrectly is a surprising event for children, whose 
expectation is that adults will be an accurate source of communicative information, thus 
unreliable models draw more attention than a model who is performing reliably. A third 
experiment was conducted to investigate the role of attention, and by extension 
expectation/surprise, on children’s responses to model reliability within our experimental 
procedure. Experiment Three measured the portion of children’s visual attention towards 
three targets: (i) the stimuli, (ii) the experimenter (a further adult source of social 
information), and (iii) distracted/non-directed looking. Not replicating the finding of 
increased fidelity with a reliable model found in previous research (e.g., Zmyj et al., 2010), a 
different task with a more overt action sequence was employed; this also allowed us to extend 
the preference effect found in Experiment One to a further task. Extension to a new task 
allowed greater generalisability to be gained, ruling-out the possibility that the effect found 
was specific to the apparatus used. 
The measuring of attention within Experiment Three allowed greater inferences to be 
made about the learning preference produced in response to differentially reliable models. 
The following are our predictions: If children find the unreliable model’s behaviour 
unexpected, as they assume adult models to be reliable sources of information we may expect 
greater attention to the unreliable model, as found by Koenig and Echols (2003); however, 
unlike in that experiment, we also measured the attention to a further potential informant (the 
experimenter). Accordingly, greater attention may be directed to the experimenter, making 
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use of social referencing towards a further adult. Alternatively, children might show more 
distracted looking when presented with the unreliable model, and direct more attention to the 
reliable model, given the potential utility of each.       
     
4. Experiment Three 
 
4.1. Method 
 
4.1.1. Participants 
 An additional 48 four- to six-year-old children (24 girls) were recruited from the same 
schools in North East England (M = 65.52, SD = 6.17). Ethical procedure and sample 
demography were the same as Experiment One and Two. 
 
4.1.2. Materials 
 The reliability stimuli were identical to those in Experiment One. To allow a more 
overt action sequence for measuring imitation fidelity, and to see if the effects found would 
transfer to a different task, the transparent ‘Glass Ceiling Box’ used by Horner and Whiten 
(2005), was used in place of the Duobox. A new social learning stimulus was created, 
showing the models performing the action sequence outlined in the procedure below. Having 
been used by Horner and Whiten to examine aspects of action imitation, and processing 
larger and more conspicuous defences, this apparatus provides a greater chance of observing 
differences in imitation fidelity, if they exist. Images from the stimulus are available in the 
Supplementary Material.  
 
4.1.3. Procedure and Design 
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 The procedure used was identical to Experiment One, with the following exceptions. 
First, cameras were specifically placed to capture where children were looking, as opposed to 
only focusing on their actions on the task. Second, the experimenter sat to the side of the 
screen displaying the stimuli, with the position of the experimenter (left or right side), being 
counter-balanced over conditions. The experimenter looked in his lap, attempting to do this 
as naturally as possible, and was unresponsive to the child if requests were made. Third, no 
matter the expressed preference of the child, they all received the social learning stimulus, 
allowing better sampling of attention during social learning. That is, even when the child 
asked to learn individually, they were told “hmmm… actually, why don’t we see how the 
woman in the video does it”.  
Therefore, a 2 level (model reliability: reliable or unreliable) between-subjects design 
was employed. After the social learning stimulus the actions copied by the participant were 
also coded (1 if present, 0 if absent, scoring a point for each one copied) to give a continuous 
imitation fidelity score with a maximum of five: (i) pulling the bolts on the apparatus out 
using a stick, (ii) putting the stick through the revealed hole in the top of the apparatus, (iii) 
tapping it three times, (iv) swiping it across the face of the apparatus, (v) sliding the door on 
the face of the apparatus to the left using the stick. The stick could then be pushed inside the 
apparatus to retrieve the reward. All children were successful in retrieving the reward. Videos 
were coded frame-by-frame at 25 frames per second, with the proportion of visual attention 
(direction of gaze) measured as being directed at the either, (i) the stimulus (monitor), (ii) 
being distracted (i.e. looking around the room), or (iii) at the experimenter. This visual 
attention measure was taken for the duration of both the reliability and social learning stimuli, 
with recording beginning as the model’s first reliability response was made of the reliability 
stimulus, until the end of the stimulus, likewise for the social learning stimulus. 
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4.2. Results 
 
4.2.1. Preliminary statistics 
 Learning preference whether social (M = 92.71, SD = 11.45) or individual (M = 95.71, 
SD = 5.63), did not influence the amount of attention given to the social learning stimulus, 
between groups t(45) = 1.05, p = .297. It did not affect the amount of distracted attention 
(social M = 4.95, SD = 8.72; individual M = 3.82, SD = 4.80), between groups t(45) = .51, p = 
.610. Nor did learning preference affect the amount of social attention, (social M = 2.34, SD = 
5.34; individual M = .48, SD = 1.81), between groups t(45) = 1.46, p = .151. Learning 
preference, whether social (M = 3.07, SD = 1.74) or individual (M = 3.00, SD = 1.48), had no 
effect on imitation, between groups t(46) = .15, p = .882. Thus we collapsed these groups in 
the analysis of model reliability and attention. 
 
4.2.2. Replication of learning preference with regard to model reliability 
 As in Experiment One, a binary logistic regression found more children in the 
unreliable model condition (coded 1, 75% new model, M = .10, SD = 1.02) chose to learn 
socially (coded 1, individually -1) than in the reliable model condition (coded -1, 55% new 
model, M = .50, SD = .89), Χ2(1, N = 48) = 7.47, p = .006, β = .84, SE = .33, p = .009. 
Further, it was found that there was no significant difference in the reliable model condition 
in social (40%) and individual (60%) learning preference, binominal t(23) = .80, p = .424. 
And again, in the unreliable model condition a significant 78% of children chose to learn 
socially rather than individually (22%), binominal t(23) = 2.50, p = .011.  
 
4.2.3. Direction of visual attention  
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 4.2.3.1. Reliability stimulus. When viewing the reliability stimulus there was no 
significant difference in the proportion of time spent looking at the stimulus with the reliable 
model (M = 86.65, SD = 12.31) and unreliable model (M = 85.66, SD = 10.58), between 
groups t(46) = .30, p = .768. There was also no difference between being presented with the 
reliable model (M = 10.53, SD = 11.93) and unreliable model (M = 7.64, SD = 8.18), in the 
proportion of distracted looking, between groups t(46) = .97, p = .336. However, there was a 
significant difference in the portion of attention directed at the experimenter, with 
significantly more attention being directed in the unreliable condition (M = 6.61, SD = 7.12) 
than in the reliable condition (M = 2.82, SD = 3.47), between groups t(46) = 2.31, p = .027.  
 4.2.3.2. Social learning stimulus. During the social learning stimulus there was no 
significant difference in attention to the social learning stimulus after viewing the reliable (M 
= 95.16, SD = 6.02) versus the unreliable (M = 92.52, SD = 12.46) model stimulus, between 
groups t(46) = .90, p = .374. There was no significant difference in time spent engaged in 
distracted looking (reliable M = 4.21, SD = 4.96; unreliable M = 4.81, SD = 9.47), between 
groups t(46) = .28, p = .781, and there was no difference in time spent looking at the 
experimenter (reliable M = .64, SD = 1.80; unreliable M = 2.65, SD = 5.95), between groups 
t(46) = 1.54, p = .137.   
 
4.2.4. Imitation fidelity by model reliability 
 In contrast to Experiment One, it was found that those in the reliable model condition 
(M = 3.72, SD = 1.24) copied with significantly more fidelity than those in the unreliable 
model condition (M = 2.30, SD = 1.69), between groups t(46) = 3.33, p = .002.  
 
4.3. Discussion  
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Experiment Three replicated the effect from Experiment One with regards to learning 
preference (extending it to a new task), with a majority of children asking to learn socially 
after witnessing an unreliable model, with there being no difference after a reliable model 
was presented. There were no differences in the amount of distracted looking or attention to 
the stimuli when children were presented with either the reliability or social learning stimuli. 
However, when viewing the reliability stimuli, a greater amount of attention was directed 
towards the experimenter when the model was unreliable rather than reliable. This is in line 
with the prediction above, that an unreliable model is a violation of children’s expectations 
about adults as reliable sources of information. Yet, unlike in Koenig and Echols (2003), this 
was not manifested in greater attention to the unreliable model, but to the experimenter; who 
the children likely saw as a further source of social information from which they could use to 
contextualise the unreliable information they witnessed. No effect of attention towards the 
experimenter was found during the reliability stimulus. Lastly, owing to a more sensitive 
apparatus for measuring imitation fidelity, we found that the reliable model led to more 
accurate action copying (as in Zmyj et al., 2010). A potential alternative explanation for the 
results of Experiment One, that a reliable model caused children to learn individually in 
greater proportion, appears unlikely given the measured propensity of children to direct more 
attention to social stimuli in the unreliable model condition.  
  
5. General Discussion 
  
The current study examined young children’s choice to learn socially or individually 
after witnessing differentially reliable models. Children preferred to learn socially after 
witnessing an unreliable model (Experiment One and Three). When children had a choice, 
they preferred to learn from a new model rather than the unreliable model they had 
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previously witnessed (Experiment Two). Therefore, children showed a general preference for 
social learning after witnessing an unreliable model, rather than a genuine preference to learn 
from an unreliable model. However, children copied the reliable model with more fidelity, in 
line with previous research (Experiment Three; Zmyj et al., 2010). Further, an unreliable 
model caused children to attend more to the experimenter: a potential further adult informant 
and source of social information (Experiment Three).  
It should be noted that in terms of manipulating model reliability, we employed a 
well-used protocol shown to be effective up to a week later (Corriveau & Harris, 2009). 
Manipulation checks affirmed children understood the names of the objects in the 
experiment, and by extension, that the model was departing from these labels. Further, 
children correctly reported model competence at identifying these objects. Lastly, model 
reliability had the effect on imitation fidelity that has been found in previous research. 
Together these facts indicate that children did encode a difference in model reliability 
between conditions, as produced by accurate versus inaccurate labelling of objects, and object 
functions.  
 An adult model acting unreliably is an unexpected event creating an uncertain 
situation for children. Their response to this uncertainty is to seek further social information, 
rather than to engage in individual learning. A simple principle of ‘when uncertain gain more 
social information’ seems to be in effect; children employing a ‘copy when uncertain’ 
strategy (Rendell et al., 2011). This is evidenced by Experiment Two which showed children 
preferred, when given an option, to seek further information from an additional model rather 
than the unreliable model, and in Experiment Three with greater attention being directed 
towards the experimenter in the unreliable model condition. The finding of greater social 
learning preference after witnessing an unreliable model (Experiment One and Three) can, 
therefore, be explained by the operation of this principle of unreliability creating a greater 
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desire for social learning, in a setup where children only had the option to learn socially from 
the model who they had previously seen. It is interesting to note that in terms of subsequent 
performance, a reliable model was associated with greater imitation fidelity (Experiment 
Three). While children did not opt for the option of individual learning in the face of an 
unreliable model, they were more likely to depart from the methods shown, and in doing so, 
allowing a greater amount of individual learning, after social learning, to take place.  
 When social information becomes uncertain research with non-human animals 
suggests that individuals revert to a strategy of individual learning and exploitation 
(Giraldeau et al., 2002); indeed, some evidence even shows animals learn more from 
unreliable models (Templeton, 1998). Alternatively, for humans, selecting to use further 
models, especially during childhood, would seem to make sense given the central value of 
culture and social life to humans (Tomasello, 1999). Compared with other animals, children 
come into the world helpless, but prepared to learn the essential survival skills of their group 
over an extended development (Nielsen, 2012). Accordingly, compared with other species, 
children grow-up in ultra-cooperative groups, marked by unusual amounts of alloparenting 
(Hill et al., 2007), where adults often invest heavily in transmitting this information (Csibra 
& Gergely, 2011). Individual learning is particularly fraught for human children, while social 
learning is particularly useful. Indeed, Wood, Kendal and Flynn (2012) showed that five-
year-olds prioritise trust in adult models, even over model knowledge state.  
Further, obeying the principle of ‘learn socially when faced with unreliability’, even 
in the context of Experiment One and Three, in which the only option was to learn from the 
unreliable model, may not be harmfully costly. Electing to learn socially only added further 
information at low cost (that of viewing the demonstration). The models in our task still 
demonstrated how to successfully perform the task, and children could still distill useful 
information from this demonstration to achieve their goal. It is notable that in the current 
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study an unreliable model did cause less accurate imitation; recent research by Carr, Kendal, 
and Flynn (2015), showed even when a model is showing low levels of efficacy on a task, 
children predominately imitated. Where Carr and colleagues manipulated model unreliability 
by model failure to retrieve a reward, overimitation research has shown that children imitate 
models using obviously causally redundant actions. Children will include these redundant 
actions, even when they are incentivised not to (Lyons et al., 2007). Zmjy and colleagues 
(2010) found an unreliable model was associated with poorer imitation in an infant sample. 
Together these results suggest that whether having demonstrated unreliability in (i) naming 
object names and functions, (ii) attaining the goal of a task, or (iii) being inefficient in using 
actions to achieve the goal of a task, children will still use these models as sources of social 
learning; albeit perhaps with a greater propensity to use divergent methods.   
 These findings add to our understanding of ‘selective trust in informants’ research. 
Typically, trust experiments have given children a forced choice between adopting the 
behaviour presented by a reliable versus an unreliable model. They have generally found 
children prefer reliable models (Harris et al., 2013; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Koenig et al., 
2004). However, experiments measuring choice resulting from models with differing 
reliability with non-comparison designs (as ours did), have found the preference for reliable 
models to be less consistent; that is, in designs where children are not given a choice based on 
a direct comparison between a reliable and unreliable model within the same condition 
(Krogh-Jespersen & Echols, 2012; Vanderbilt et al., 2014). Our study used a genuinely novel 
measure, learning preference, where previous studies have generally examined which 
behaviour is copied, that of a reliable or unreliable model. As to the hypotheses mentioned, 
the results supported greater social learning, as preferred to individual learning, after seeing 
an unreliable model. However, we would argue that this does not necessarily imply greater 
trust, but, as explained, a greater proclivity to want to learn socially given the uncertainty 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
MODEL RELIABILITY ON SOCIAL OR INDIVIDUAL LEARNING  27 
 
 
created by an unreliable model (similar logic given by Koenig & Echols, 2003). When other 
adults are presented in the experiment, children both request to learn from them, and direct 
more attention towards them, after being presented with an unreliable model rather than a 
reliable model. As far as trust (the propensity to rely on an informant), our experiment did 
find selective trust in reliable informants, as evidenced by the accuracy of imitation. So our 
findings suggest, first, learning preference does not map neatly onto selective trust, in an 
intuitive way; instead more social learning requests were made for unreliable models. 
Second, our findings suggest that further novel and diverging designs are required to continue 
to fully explore the effect of model reliability on children’s learning and development. Using 
forced choice versus separate condition designs appear to create less consistent findings of 
trust, and therefore, it would be informative to examine the outcome of an experiment in 
which learning preference was present in a forced choice design. Second, decoupling 
‘learning from’ and ‘acting on the basis of’ will likely also be informative; our results 
suggesting that learning from unreliable models may still occur and be a proclivity of 
children. However, modulating the use of that information in how one acts is where greater 
costs occur, and this may be where key differences lie. Lastly, our results suggest including 
additional informants may importantly change behaviour, third party individuals may be seen 
as candidates for further information by children; this is also a move towards greater 
ecological validity, given children develop in a context where multiple adults and be 
conferred with.    
Experiment One suggested that developmental differences between three- and five-
years-old were not substantial, however, five-year-olds did show a preference to learn 
socially after witnessing a previously unreliable model, not found at three years. Further 
research is needed to properly address the development of learning preference across early 
years. Any potential difference was not a result of the level of understanding of the 
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manipulation: both age groups demonstrated that they knew the names and functions of the 
familiar objects. More likely there is a difference in how three- and five-year-olds interpret a 
model’s incorrect identification of object names and functions. Three-year-olds are still 
acquiring labels and a model using a novel label may be a weaker cue of unreliability, 
because the model may be using valid labels the child has not yet encountered. Model 
reliability did not affect children’s goal copying behaviour, however, five-year-olds in the 
current study copied the demonstrated action sequence more accurately than the three-year-
olds; which is in line with research showing a propensity to imitate actions increases with age 
(Flynn & Smith, 2012; McGuigan, Makinson, & Whiten, 2011). Experiment Three showed 
that imitation fidelity was detected with a more sensitive apparatus. If children can interpret 
goals over actions (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002; Meltzoff, 1988; although see Lyons 
et al., 2007) children should prefer to match the goals of reliable over unreliable models, in 
the same way as they do actions. We predict that a different instantiation of goal copying may 
validate this prediction.   
 In conclusion, the present study sheds new light on to the effect of a model’s 
reliability on children’s social learning. These results suggest that it is not simply the case 
that children choose to observe reliable models. By giving children the option to learn 
individually rather than having to copy either a reliable or unreliable in a forced choice, our 
results suggest an unreliable model increases children’s requests for social information and 
attention, and, when possible, this is requested from an additional model. New and diverging 
designs must be used to get a full picture of the effects of a model’s reliability on children’s 
selective social learning behaviour; future studies are needed to elaborate how to interpret 
children’s learning preference. Further, we considered how children’s expectations of adults 
as reliable sources of information may affect information seeking and subsequent behaviours, 
in the light of the evidenced pictured of the social and cultural environment in which children 
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develop.  For children, much more than non-human animals, social information is a crucial 
avenue to learn about the world, a propensity to use social information occurs even in the 
face of unreliable models; yet, our findings are suggestive of mechanisms which influence 
differential utilisation of information attained from unreliable models.  
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Figures and Tables  
 
 
Figure 1. Duobox: left-side shows box in assembled state, right-side shows box with defences 
removed. (a) ‘bolt’, (b) ‘lock’, (c) ‘hook’, (d) ‘latch’.    
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Figure 2. Experiment One: Percentage of children selecting a preference for learning 
socially versus individually, by age group and model reliability (error bars show ± 95% CI).  
 
 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
80% 
90% 
100% 
Reliable model Unreliable model Reliable model Unreliable model  
Three-year-olds Five-year-olds 
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
ch
il
d
re
n
 
Individual learning 
Social learning  * 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
MODEL RELIABILITY ON SOCIAL OR INDIVIDUAL LEARNING  36 
 
 
  
Figure 3. Experiment Two: Percentage of children choosing a new model versus the model 
they had previously seen (old model) being either reliable or unreliable (error bars show ± 
95% CI).  
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Table 1. 
Task performance variables after seeing a reliable or unreliable model, or a no model control, for both five- and three-year-olds.  
  Imitation fidelity  Goal copying  Task success 
 
n Exact copy Other p 
 Match 
model 
Large 
reward 
p 
 
Successful Unsuccessful p 
Five-year-olds             
Control  16 12% 88% .004*  19% 81% .021*  88% 12% .004* 
Reliable  15 60% 40% .606  60% 40% .607  100% 0%  
Unreliable 28 43% 57% .606  61% 39% .345  93% 7% .001* 
Three-year-olds             
Control 16 6% 94% .001*  31% 69% .210  44% 56% .804 
Reliable  12 17% 83% .043*  58% 42% .773  83% 17% .043* 
Unreliable 22 18% 82% .006*  67% 33% .523  86% 14% .001* 
Binominal t-test. *p < .05 
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Table 2.  
Experiment One: Comparing model reliability and age on task performance variables.  
 Full model  Predictors 
 Χ2 df p  β SE p 
Imitation fidelity 9.17 2 .010*     
     Model reliability     -.22 .26 .411 
     Age     .76 .27 .006* 
Goal copying .25 2 .987     
     Model reliability     .02 .24 .950 
     Age     .03 .23 .884 
Task success  4.57 2 .102     
     Model reliability     -.37 .28 .184 
     Age     .43 .27 .116 
     Learn. Pref.     .70 .27 .009* 
Note. N = 124. *p < .05 Codings for model reliability (unreliable 1, reliable -1), age (five 1, three -1), other variable codings as per section 2.1.4.  
